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Finding the Tipping Point: When Sovereign Debt Turns Bad Mehmet Caner, Thomas Grennes, and Fritzi Koehler-Geib P ublic debt has increased substantially for countries at all income levels as a result of the current global economic crisis. Historical evidence indicates that increases in debt persist for years following financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010; Scott 2010) . In addition, projections of standard measures of public debt relative to GDP for the next 30 years indicate that debt levels are unsustainable for many countries (Cecchetti, Moharty, and Zampolli 2010) . Taking account of the implicit public debt associated with social security, medical care, and contingent liabilities would reveal a substantially magnified debt problem (Cecchetti, Moharty, and Zampolli 2010) .
The increase in public debt has raised concerns over whether it is starting to hit levels at which it might slow economic growth. Does such a "tipping point" exist? How strong would the growth impact be if debt surpassed the threshold? What would happen if debt stayed at elevated levels for an extended period of time?
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) , the answer to the first question is "yes." Using histograms summarizing evidence from 44 developed and developing economies, they find a threshold of 90 percent central government debt to GDP, after which the real growth rate declines. This threshold has received considerable attention in the press, which has referred to it as a "tipping point" (Pozen 2010) . The threshold has practical significance because the United States and many other countries either have reached this point or are projected to reach it soon and remain above it for years.
The main variables are gross public debt, GDP growth, and a set of control variables known to influence economic growth (table 3.1). 3 Public debt is measured as the ratio of general government gross debt to GDP. When considering the debt-growth nexus, debt at all levels of government is relevant, because it influences the government's ability to engage in growth-enhancing potentially countercyclical policies. The average debt to GDP ratio was 67.1 percent for the entire sample (59.9 percent for highincome countries). Average GDP growth was 3.8 percent for the entire sample (2.6 percent for high-income countries).
We consider inflation, trade openness, and initial GDP as control variables. The inflation variable is self-explanatory. Trade openness is calculated as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services relative to GDP. Initial GDP is calculated as the logarithm of per capita GDP in 1970. A date before the start of the time period is chosen to ensure the absence of endogeneity.
Methodology
The main results of the analysis draw on a threshold least squares regression model following Hansen (1996 Hansen ( , 2000 . We also use pooled least squares regressions, to relate our findings to those of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) . The description of the methodology here focuses on the threshold estimation technique (we do not account for potential endogeneity in the regressions). Threshold estimation is used because it is superior to other techniques that have been used to estimate a nonlinear function. It allows one to identify the threshold level, its significance, the coefficients of the different regimes, and their significance simultaneously from the data based on a solid theory.
Threshold Regression Model
The specification of the threshold least squares regression model is as follows:
where 1 represents an indicator function that takes the value of one when the event inside happens and zero when it does not; Y represents the longrun average real growth rate; X represents the long-run average public debt to GDP ratio; W represents control variables; and i is a country index.
The unknown threshold value l as well as the coefficients b 0,1 through b 2,2 are estimated with the threshold least squares method of Hansen (2000) . Equation 3.1 can be rewritten in two equations, in which the first represents the regime below the threshold and the second represents the regime above the threshold:
A more specific methodology would be to set thresholds on selected control variables. Here, however, we start from a more general specification with two separate regimes, as described in equation (3.1).
Test for Threshold
We test for a threshold in the relationship between the long-run average public debt to GDP ratio and long-run average growth to verify the model in equation (3.1). The null hypothesis is that the slope coefficients and intercepts are identical in the two regimes. In equation (3.1) this means that by using a heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange multiplier test (Hansen 1996) , we test the following null hypothesis:
If there is no threshold, expression (3.2) will not be rejected, and a simple least squares model can be estimated. If there is a threshold effect, equation (3.1), including the unknown threshold value of λ, is estimated. Bootstrap p-values are used for this purpose, because they can replicate the asymptotic distribution, as Hansen shows (1996) .
Results
Overall, the results suggest that thresholds exist in the relationship between the long-run average public debt to GDP ratio and long-run GDP growth. They suggest that it is crucial to take into account initial GDP, that the threshold level differs for developing and developed economies, and that the cost of surpassing the debt threshold is high over time.
A note of caution concerns the potential endogeneity of long-run average debt. Because we focus here on the relation between long-run average debt and long-run GDP growth, we cannot use the instrumental variable threshold technique of Caner and Hansen (2004) , which relies on shortrun averages as instruments. Short-run average debt can be used to address a different research question, which we will tackle through panel data analysis in a future project.
We address potential endogeneity by adding initial debt/GDP (1980) to the estimations to control for omitted variables bias and reverse causality. The results remain qualitatively the same with the same threshold values and small changes of the coefficients in the two regimes.
Debt Threshold for All Countries
The first main result is that the threshold level of the average long-run public debt to GDP ratio on GDP growth is 77.1 percent for the entire sample of 79 countries (initial GDP data were not available for 22 countries) (table 3.2). If debt surpasses this level, each additional percentage point in the ratio of public debt to GDP costs the economy 0.0174 percentage point in annual average real growth. This effect is highly significant and quantitatively important. Below this threshold, additional debt increases growth (the estimated coefficient is 0.065). This result is consistent with the idea that at moderate debt levels, a higher public debt to GDP ratio may actually imply that credit constraints are looser and the economy has more resources available for investment.
The results are derived from the model in equation (3.1), first developed by Hansen (1996) , when equation (3.2) is rejected. We control for the (logarithm of) initial (1970) GDP per capita, inflation, and trade openness. The test statistic for the Lagrangean multiplier test is 14.21. Because the limit is nonstandard but recoverable by a bootstrap procedure (Hansen 1996) , the p-value from 1,000 bootstrap replications is 0.093, significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficients on inflation are insignificant. Trade has a positive effect on the growth under the high-debt regime, possibly because more credit is available for trade. Initial GDP per capita coefficients are significant and much higher in low-debt than high-debt regimes.
Debt Threshold Excluding Initial GDP
The second main result is that it is crucial to include initial GDP in the estimations. Repeating the estimations but omitting initial GDP significantly changes the threshold value. The estimated threshold for the debt to GDP ratio is 97.6 percent (table 3.3). The impact is small but highly significant and positive.
The results are derived from a Lagrangean multiplier test of equation (3.2). The test statistic for the Lagrangean multiplier test is 12.75, with a bootstrap p-value from 1,000 bootstrap replications of 0.097, significant at the 10 percent level. The country sample covers all 99 countries.
Debt Thresholds in Developing and Developed Economies
The third main result is that the threshold differs substantially for developing and developed economies. Repeating the estimations for the subsample of developing countries yields a debt to GDP threshold of 64 percent. Moreover, the negative impact of debt exceeding this threshold is slightly greater than in the full set of countries (coefficient is -0.020 compared with -0.017 for the entire sample). We would have liked to repeat the exercise for the sample of developed countries only, but the small number (26) of countries made doing so impossible. The difference between the threshold for the full sample and the threshold for developing countries suggests that as a group, developing countries encounter growth rate problems at a lower debt to GDP level.
The results, based on a Lagrangean multiplier test of equation (3.2), reveal the existence of a threshold (table 3.4). The coefficient for the Lagrangean multiplier test is 18.66; the bootstrap p-value is 0.002. The sample size of developing countries is 55 (reduced by lack of data on initial GDP for some countries). Coefficients on the control variables show the expected signs. Interestingly, the coefficient on trade openness is positive for high-debt regimes, which is understandable, but negative for low-debt regimes, possibly because of trade barriers.
Growth Costs of Exceeding the Debt Threshold
The fourth main result is that the impact of the public debt to GDP ratio exceeding the threshold level is costly in terms of GDP growth (table 3.5). The most extreme case is Nicaragua, where the average annual real growth rate could have been 4.7 percent higher had debt been at the 64 percent debt threshold for developing countries. High indebtedness was responsible for Source: Authors. Note: Dependent variable is real average GDP growth. R 2 is 0.98 for both regimes. There are 16 countries in the first regime and 40 in the second regime. The 95 percent confidence interval for the debt to GDP ratio is [-0.0312, -0.0088] in regime 1 and [0.0491, 0.0965] in regime 2. These results are based on the likelihood ratio test in Hansen (2000) . The 95 percent confidence interval for the threshold estimate is [0.6335, 0.8524]. * Significant at the 5 percent level using standard normal critical values, as in Hansen (2000) . an annual loss of 4.7 percentage points of real GDP growth, equivalent to a 264 percent loss over the 28 years of the study. This example illustrates the high costs of persistent violations of debt threshold levels.
Comparison of Results with Results of Reinhart and Rogoff
We compare our findings with those of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) by running simple pooled least squares regressions for subsamples below and above the threshold they suggest. In the pooled regressions, we find a regime switch at the 90 percent debt to GDP ratio, as indicated by Reinhart and Rogoff's analysis based on histograms. However, repeating the pooled regressions with a debt threshold of 60 percent also shows a regime switch. These results illustrate that their methodology does not deliver clear threshold levels. Moreover, given the demonstrated importance of controlling for initial GDP, the use of histograms or pooled regressions can be only indicative and must be interpreted with care. At least over longer periods, public debt can become detrimental to growth at lower levels of debt. 4 We pool observations on GDP growth and government debt to GDP ratios for the same 20 industrial countries as Reinhart and Rogoff. We then run simple pooled least squares (with heteroskedasticity-corrected errors) for two sets of countries. The first set contains countries with debt levels of at least 90 percent (table 3.6). The second includes countries with debt ratios below 90 percent. We compare the slope coefficients for the government debt to GDP ratios for the two sets of regressions. The result allows a more precise comparison of countries above and below the threshold than Reinhart and Rogoff. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) suggest, there is a regime switch at the 90 percent debt to GDP ratio. 5 We extend this simple exercise by also considering a 60 percent public debt to GDP ratio. The first set of observations corresponds to debt ratios above 60 percent, and the second group is for debt ratios below 60 percent. The difference between slope coefficients for the two groups is small compared with the 90 percent threshold. However, in these regressions there is a regime switch at the threshold level, with the impact of debt on GDP turning negative above. 
Concluding Remarks
This analysis provides an analytical foundation for the debt-growth relationship by formally testing for the existence of a threshold and estimating the threshold value while controlling for other important variables that influence growth. The threshold value is sensitive to the inclusion of income per capita, and it decreases when high-income countries are excluded from the sample.
The main findings are that the threshold level of the average long-run public debt to GDP ratio on GDP growth is 77 percent for the full sample and 64 percent for the subsample of developing countries. Surpassing these thresholds is costly for countries, which forgo GDP growth if debt exceeds the threshold for an extended period.
The analysis of debt thresholds can be informative, but threshold levels should be interpreted with caution. Our analysis is based on long-term averages over nearly 30 years, so that temporary deviations from the average need not have important negative effects on growth. If a country's debt ratio exceeds the threshold for a year or two because of a recession, its long-term growth need not suffer (Scott 2010) . The existence of debt thresholds need not preclude short-term fiscal stabilization policy (Leeper and Bi 2010) . If debt explosions move debt ratios above the threshold and keep them there for decades, however, economic growth is likely to suffer. 
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